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I.1. Introduction
The terminologies used in biomedical research, clinical practice, and health 
information management today grew out of the medical dictionaries of an 
earlier era. Such dictionaries, of course, were created to be used by human 
beings, and the early steps towards standardization of terminologies in the 
1930s were designed, above all, to enable clear understanding of terms in 
different languages; for example, on the part of those engaged in gathering 
data on an international scale. With the increasing importance of 
computers, however, came the recognition that standardization of 
terminology must go beyond the needs of humans, and it is especially in 
the biomedical domain – with terminologies such as SNOMED (see 
SNOMED 2007) and controlled vocabularies such as the Gene Ontology 
(see Gene Ontology 2007) – that the power of formal representation of 
terminological knowledge has been explored most systematically. The need 
for such formal, computer-processable representations becomes all the 
more urgent with the enormous increase in the amounts and varieties of 
data with which biomedical researchers are confronted, data which can no 
longer be surveyed without the aid of powerful informatics tools. 
I.2. The Concept Orientation 
Unfortunately, the new formalized biomedical terminologies were 
developed against the background of what are now coming to be 
recognized as a series of major and minor philosophical errors. Very 
roughly, the developers of terminologies made the assumption that we 
cannot have knowledge of the real world, but only of our thoughts. 
Therefore, they inferred, it is thoughts to which our terms (and our 
terminologies) necessarily refer – thoughts which, as we shall see, were 
understood as being crystallized in the form of what were called concepts. 
What the term ‘concept’ might precisely mean, however, was never 
clearly expressed, and it takes some considerable pains to extract a 
coherent reading of this term from the standard terminological literature. In 
fact, four loose families of readings can be distinguished, which we can 
refer to as the linguistic, the psychological, the epistemological, and the 
ontological. On the linguistic view, concepts are general terms whose
meanings have been somehow regimented (or, as on some variants of the 
view, they are these meanings themselves). On the psychological view, 
concepts are mental entities analogous to ideas or beliefs. On the 
epistemological view, concepts are units of knowledge, such as your child’s 
concept of a cat or of a square. And on the ontological view, concepts are 
abstractions of kinds or of properties (i.e., of general invariant patterns) 
belonging to entities in the world. As we will see in what follows, elements 
of all these views can be found, in various combinations, in the literature 
(Smith, 2004). 
The most influential biomedical terminologies, including almost all of 
the terminologies collected together in the Metathesaurus of the Unified 
Medical Language System (see National Library of Medicine), have been 
developed in the spirit of the concept orientation (Smith, 2005a). These 
terminologies have proved to be of great practical importance in the 
development of biomedical informatics. However, the ambiguities 
surrounding their use of the term ‘concept’ engenders problems which have 
been neglected in the informatics literature. As will become clear in what 
follows, the concept orientation exacerbates many of the problems which it 
was intended to solve, and introduces new problems of its own. 
I.2.1. The Birth of the Concept Orientation (I): Eugen Wüster and the 
International Organization for Standardization 
The concept orientation in terminology work goes back at least as far as 
the 1930s, when Eugen Wüster began to develop a theory of terms and 
concepts which later became entrenched as the terminology standard 
promulgated by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
(ISO, N.D.; Smith, 2005b). Through the powerful influence of the ISO, 
Wüster’s standard continues to be felt today wherever standardized 
terminologies are needed, not least in the areas of biomedicine and 
biomedical informatics. However, Wüster’s standard was developed for 
terminologies used by humans; it does not meet the requirements placed on 
standardized terminologies in the era of the computer. In spite of this, the 
quasi-legal precedent-based policies of ISO – in which newer standards are 
required to conform as far as possible to those already established – have 
84
prevented adequate adaptation of standards. Even the most recent ISO 
standards developed in the terminology domain betray a sloppiness and 
lack of clarity in their formulations which falls far short of meeting 
contemporary requirements. 
Human language is in constant flux. Focusing terminology development 
on the study of concepts was, for Wüster, a way of shouting ‘Stop!’ in the 
attempt to sidestep the tide of variances in human language use, which he 
saw as impediments to human communication across languages; for 
example (and uppermost in Wüster’s own mind) in the context of 
international trade. (Wüster, himself, was a businessman and manufacturer 
of woodworking machinery.) Since the actual human thoughts associated 
with language use are an unreliable foundation upon which to base any 
system for standardizing the use of words, Wüster’s solution was to 
effectively invent a new realm – the realm of concepts – in which the 
normal ebb and flow of human thought associated with the hitherto 
predominating term orientation would be somehow neutralized. Consider, 
for example, the way in which a term like ‘cell’ is used in different 
contexts to mean unit of life, a small enclosed space, a small militant 
group, unit in a grid or pigeonhole system, and so forth. From Wüster’s 
point of view, there was a different concept associated with each of these 
contexts. Concepts, somehow, are crystallized out of the amorphous variety 
of different usages among the different groups of human beings involved. 
At the same time, Wüster defended a psychological view of these 
concepts – which means that he saw concepts as mental entities – 
sometimes writing as if, in order to apprehend concepts, we would need to 
gain access to the interiors of each other’s brains (Wüster, 2003): 
If a speaker wishes to draw the attention of an interlocutor to a particular 
individual object, which is visible to both parties or which he carries with him, he 
only has to point to it, or, respectively, show it. If the object, however, is in 
another place, it is normally impossible to produce it for the purpose of showing 
it. In this case the only thing available is the individual concept of the object, 
provided that it is readily accessible in the heads of both persons.
Thus, for Wüster a concept is an element of thought, existing entirely in the 
minds of human subjects. On this view, an individual concept (such as 
blood) is a mental surrogate of an individual object (such as the blood 
running through your veins); a general concept (such as rabbit or fruit) is a 
mental surrogate of a plurality of objects (Smith, 2005b). Individual 
concepts stand for objects which human beings are able to apprehend 
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through perceptual experience. General concepts stand for similarities 
between these objects. Both individual and general concepts are human 
creations, and the hierarchy of general concepts (from, say, Granny Smith 
to apple to fruit) arises as the cumulative reflection of the choices made by 
humans in grouping objects together. Since these choices will vary from 
one community to another, standardization is needed in order to determine 
a common set of general concepts to which terminologies would be 
related; for instance, in order to remove obstacles to international trade. 
The perceived similarities which serve as starting points for such 
groupings are reified by Wüster under the heading of what he calls 
‘characteristics’, a term which, like the term ‘concept’, has been embraced 
by the terminology community (and, thereby, has also fallen prey to a 
variety of conflicting views). In some passages, Wüster himself seems 
happy to identify characteristics with properties on the side of the objects 
themselves. In others, however, he identifies them as further concepts, so 
that they too (incoherently) would exist in the heads of human beings 
(Smith, 2005b). Thus, Wüster’s thought results in an uncomfortable 
straddling of the realms of mind (ideas and meanings) and world (objects 
and their properties). 
This fissure appears in Wüster’s treatment of the extension of a concept 
as well, which he sometimes conceives in the standard way as the ‘totality 
of all individual objects which fall under a given concept’ (Smith, 2006; 
Wüster, 1979). Unfortunately, Wüster also allows a second reading of 
‘extension’ as meaning ‘the totality of all subordinated concepts’. So, on 
the one hand the extension of the concept pneumonia would be the totality 
of cases or instances of pneumonia; but, on the other hand, it would be a 
collection of more specific concepts (bacterial pneumonia, viral
pneumonia, mycoplasma pneumonia, interstitial pneumonia, horse 
pneumonia, and so on). 
Another characteristic unclarity of Wüster’s thinking is reflected in his 
definition of ‘object’ as ‘anything to which human thought is or can be 
directed’. This definition has been given normative standing through its 
adoption in the relevant ISO standards, which similarly define ‘object’ as 
‘anything perceived or conceived’ (ISO, ‘Text for FDIS 704. Terminology 
work: Principles and methods’). 
This ISO definition implies that ‘object’ can embrace, in Wüsterian 
spirit, not only the material but also the immaterial, not only the real but 
also the ‘purely imagined, for example, a unicorn, a philosopher’s stone, or 
a literary character’ (ISO, Information Technology for Learning, 
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Education, and Training; ISO, Vocabulary of Terminology). Given this 
characterization of ‘object’, we believe, ISO undercuts any view of the 
relation between concepts and corresponding objects in reality that might 
be compatible with the needs of empirical science (including the needs of 
contemporary evidence-based medicine). For its definition of ‘object’ 
would imply that the extension of the concept pneumonia should be 
allowed to include, not only your pneumonia and my pneumonia, but also, 
for example, cases of unicorn pneumonia or of pneumonia in Russian 
fiction. Of course there is nothing wrong with employing the term ‘object’ 
to mean, roughly, ‘anything to which human thought can be directed’. The 
problem is that ISO allows no other term which would be used to 
distinguish those terms which are intended to be directed towards real 
things and those terms which merely refer to objects in this very loose 
sense. Matters are made even worse by ISO’s edict that: 
[i]n the course of producing a terminology, philosophical discussions on whether 
an object actually exists in reality… are to be avoided. Objects are assumed to 
exist and attention is to be focused on how one deals with objects for the purposes 
of communication. (ISO, ‘Text for FDIS 704’) 
It is precisely such philosophical discussions which are required if we are 
to undo the sore effects of Wüster’s influence. 
More recent ISO documents reveal efforts to increase clarity by 
embracing elements of a more properly ontological reading of the term 
‘concept’, the view that concepts are abstractions of kinds which exist in 
the world. Unfortunately, however, in keeping with ISO’s quasi-legal view 
of standards as enjoying some of the attributes of stare decisis, this is done 
in such a way that remnants of the older views are still allowed to remain. 
Thus, in ISO 1087-1:2000, ‘concept’ is defined variously as a ‘unit of 
thought constituted through abstraction on the basis of properties common 
to a set of objects’, or ‘unit of knowledge created by a unique combination 
of characteristics’, where ‘characteristic’ is defined as an ‘abstraction of a 
property of an object or of a set of objects’. Since ‘object’ is still defined as 
‘anything perceivable or conceivable’ (a unicorn still being listed by ISO as 
a specific example of the latter), the clarificatory effects of this move are, 
once again, rendered nugatory by the surrounding accumulation of 
inconsistencies. 
As Temmerman argues, Wüster’s version of the concept orientation 
stands in conflict with many of the insights gained through research in 
cognitive science in recent years (Temmerman, 2000). His account of 
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concept learning and his insistence on the arbitrariness of concept-
formation rest on ideas that have long since been called into question by 
cognitive scientists. Even very small children manifest, in surprisingly 
uniform ways, an ability to apprehend objects in their surroundings as 
instances of natural kinds in ways which go far beyond what they 
apprehend in perceptual experience. Thus, there is now much evidence 
(documented, for example, in Gelman, 1991) to the effect that our ability to 
cognize objects and processes in a domain like biology rests on a shared 
innate capacity to apprehend our surrounding world in terms of (invisible) 
underlying structures or powers (whose workings we may subsequently 
learn to comprehend; for example through inquiries in genetics).
I.2.2. The Birth of the Concept Orientation (II): James Cimino’s Desiderata 
By the time of James Cimino’s important paper (Cimino, 1998), 
biomedical terminologies faced two major problems. The first problem 
concerned the legacy of the influential concept orientation as conceived by 
Wüster, which we will explore in greater depth in what follows. The upshot 
of this legacy was an endemic lack of precision, not only with regard to 
what concepts might be, but also with regard to their role in terminology 
work. The second problem revolved around the introduction of computers 
into the terminological domain. Computer-based applications rely on 
precision, in both syntax and semantics, in a way that human cognition 
does not. 
In an attempt to address these problems, James Cimino introduced a set 
of desiderata which must be satisfied by medical terminologies if they are 
to support modern computer applications. In what follows, we shall argue 
that many of Cimino’s desiderata ought to be accepted by those involved in 
terminology work; but only when they have been subjected to radical 
reinterpretation. 
Cimino’s principal thesis is that those involved in terminology work 
should focus their attentions, not on terms or words or their meanings, but 
rather on concepts. Unlike Wüster, Cimino comes close to embracing a 
linguistic rather than a psychological view of concepts. A concept, he says, 
is ‘an embodiment of a particular meaning’ (Cimino, 1998, p. 395), which 
means that it is something like a term that has been extricated from the 
flow of language so as not to change when the language does. One of his 
desiderata for a well-constructed medical terminology is accordingly that 
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of concept permanence: the meaning of a concept, once created, is 
inviolate. Three further desiderata are:
Concepts which form the nodes of the terminology must correspond to at least 
one meaning (non-vagueness). 
   Concepts must correspond to no more than one meaning (non-ambiguity). 
Meanings must themselves correspond to no more than one concept (non-
redundancy).  
If these requirements are met, the preferred terms of a well-constructed 
terminology will be mapped in one-to-one fashion to corresponding 
meanings. (A preferred term is that term out of a set of synonyms which 
the terminology chooses to link directly to a definition.) On Cimino’s view, 
a concept corresponds to a plurality of words and expressions that are 
synonymous with one another. 
However, Cimino recognizes that synonymy is not an equivalence 
relation dividing up the domain of terms neatly into disjoint sets of 
synonyms. Often, words which are synonyms relative to some types of 
context are not synonyms relative to others (e.g., a bat in a cave is not the 
same as a bat in a baseball game). To resolve this problem, he invokes the 
further desideratum of context representation, which requires a 
terminology to specify, formally and explicitly, the way in which a concept 
is used within different types of contexts. (We will leave open the question 
of whether, if concepts can be used differently in different contexts, this 
violates the non-ambiguity desideratum.) If, however, we are right in our 
view that concepts, for Cimino, are themselves (or correspond in one-to- 
one fashion to) sets of synonyms, then concepts should thereby be 
relativized to contexts already. Thus, in formulating the desideratum of 
context representation he ought more properly to speak, not of concepts,
but rather of terms themselves, as these are used in different types of 
contexts. If this is so, however, then his strategy for realizing the concept
orientation requires that he take seriously that term orientation which 
predominated in early phases of terminology work; phases dominated by 
the concern with (printed) dictionaries, a concern which (if we understand 
Cimino’s views correctly) the concept orientation was designed to do away 
with.
Concepts understood as sets of synonyms, presumably, ought to be seen 
as standing in different kinds of meaning-relations: is narrower in meaning 
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than, is wider in meaning than, and so forth. Cimino, however, follows the 
usage now common in much work on biomedical terminologies in 
speaking of concepts as being linked together also by ontological relations, 
such as caused by, site of, or treated with (Cimino, 1998). As I am sure he 
would be the first to accept, sets of synonymous terms do not stand to each 
other in causal, locational, or therapeutic relations. In fact, by allowing the 
latter it seems that Cimino is embracing elements of an ontological view of 
concepts according to which concepts would be abstractions from entities 
in reality. 
I.2.3. The Ontological View and the Realist Orientation 
On the ontological view, concepts are seen as abstractions of kinds or 
properties in the real world. This view has advantages over the linguistic 
and psychological views of concepts when it comes to understanding many 
of the ways the terms in medical terminologies are, in fact, used by 
clinicians in making diagnoses. Clinicians refer to objects, such as blood 
clots and kidneys; properties which these objects have; and the kinds
which they instantiate. Cimino, himself, tends toward the ontological view 
occasionally as, for example, when he refers to the concept diabetes
mellitus becoming ‘associated with a diabetic patient’ (p. 399). 
Presumably, this association does not come about because the physician 
has the patient on his left, and the concept on his right, and decides that the 
two are fitted together to stand in some unspecified association relation. 
Rather, there is something about the patient, something in reality, which 
the clinician apprehends and which makes it true that this concept can be 
applied to this case. Fatefully, however, like other proponents of the 
concept orientation, Cimino does not address the ontological question of 
what it is on the side of the patient which would warrant the assertion that 
an association of the given sort obtains. In other words, he does not address 
the issue of what it is in the world to which concepts such as diabetes, type
II diabetes, or endothelial dysfunction would correspond. 
The ontological view provides us with a means to understand how the 
corresponding terms can be associated directly with corresponding entities 
in the biomedical domain. It thereby opens up the question as to the 
purpose of fabricating concepts to stand in as proxies for those entities. 
Why should terms in terminologies refer indirectly to the world, when 
doctors and biologists are able to talk about the world directly? Of course, 
the original motivation for fabricating the conceptual realm on the part of 
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those such as Wüster was the belief that it was impossible to refer to the 
world directly. But this belief was based on a philosophical presupposition 
(still accepted today by an influential constituency among philosophers) to 
the effect that we have direct cognitive access only to our thoughts, not to 
entities in external reality. By contrast, scientists have never stopped 
referring to entities in the world directly and, on this basis, have succeeded 
in constructing theories with remarkable explanatory and predictive power 
which have undergirded remarkable technological and therapeutic 
advances. This is one major motivation for our promotion of the realist 
orientation, which we advance as a substitute for the concept orientation, 
not only because it eliminates the unclarities associated with the latter, but 
also because of its greater affinity with the methods of empirical science. 
On the realist orientation, when scientists make successful claims about 
the types of entities that exist in reality, they are referring to objectively 
existing entities which realist philosophers call universals or natural kinds.
A universal can be multiply instantiated by, and is known through, the 
particular objects, processes, and so forth, which instantiate it. For 
example, the universal heart is instantiated by your heart and by the heart 
of every other vertebrate. Universals reflect the similarities at different 
levels of generality between the different entities in the reality which 
surround us; every heart is characterized by certain qualities exemplified 
by the universal heart, every heartbeat is characterized by certain qualities 
exemplified by the universal heartbeat, and so on.  
There is another motivation which we take as supporting a realist 
orientation. The concept orientation assumes that every term used in a 
terminology corresponds to some concept in reality and such 
correspondence is guaranteed; it applies as much to concepts such as 
unicorn or pneumonia in Russian fiction as to concepts such as heartbeat
or glucose. However, many terms in medical terminologies are not 
associated with any universal. There are no universals corresponding, for 
example, to terms from ICD-9-CM such as: 
probable suicide 
possible tubo-ovarian abscess 
gallbladder calculus without mention of cholecystitis
atypical squamous cells of uncertain significance, probably benign.
Such terms do not represent entities in reality as they exist 
independently of our testing, measuring, and inquiring activities. Rather, as 
Bodenreider, et al. (2004) point out, they have the status of disguised 
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sentences representing our ways of gaining knowledge of such entities. 
This distinction, invisible on the concept orientation, is brought into the 
light by realism. And it is a distinction which will become increasingly 
important as automatic systems are called upon to process data in the 
clinical domain. 
It is the existence of universals which allows us to describe multiple 
particulars using one and the same general term and, thus, makes science 
possible. Science is concerned precisely with what is general in reality; it 
is interested, not in this or that macrophage, but in macrophages in 
general. It is the existence of such universals which makes diagnosis and 
treatment possible, by enabling uniform diagnostic and treatment methods 
(and associated clinical guidelines) to be applied to pluralities of patients 
encountered in different times and places. In what follows, we will show 
the advantages that a realist orientation has over the concept orientation in 
the creation and maintenance of terminologies as well as in other areas of 
knowledge representation. 
I.3. Concepts are Insufficient for All Areas of Knowledge Representation 
I.3.1. Some Arguments for the Concept Orientation and Realist Responses
One argument in favor of conceptualism in knowledge representation is 
what we can call the argument from intellectual modesty, which asserts that 
it is not up to terminology developers to ascertain the truth of whatever 
theories the terminology is intended to mirror. This is the job of domain 
experts. Since domain experts themselves often disagree, a terminology 
should represent no claims as to what the world is like; instead, it should 
reflect a conglomeration formed out of the concepts used by different 
experts.
In fact, however, scientists in medical fields (and other fields) accept a 
large and increasing body of consensus truths about the entities in these 
domains. Admittedly, many of these truths are of a trivial sort (that 
mammals have hearts, that organisms are made of cells), but it is precisely 
such truths which form the core of science-based ontologies. When there 
are conflicts between one theory or research community and another, these 
tend to be highly localized, pertaining to specific mechanisms; for 
example, of drug action or disease development. Furthermore, such areas 
of research can serve as loci of conflicting beliefs only because the 
researchers involved share a huge body of common presuppositions. 
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We can think of no scenario under which it would make sense to 
postulate special entities called concepts as the entities to which terms 
subject to scientific dispute would refer. Since for any such term, either the 
dispute is resolved in its favor, and then it is the corresponding entity in 
reality that has served as its referent all along; or it is established that the 
term in question does not designate anything at all, and the term will then, 
in the course of time, be dropped from the terminology altogether. The 
problem that arises from the fact that we do not know, at a given stage of 
scientific inquiry, whether or not a given term has a referent in reality, 
cannot be solved by providing such terms with guaranteed referents called 
concepts.
Sometimes the argument from intellectual modesty takes an extreme 
form, as in the case of those who consider reality itself to be somehow 
unknowable (as in, ‘we can only ever know our own concepts’). 
Arguments along these lines, of course, are familiar not only from the 
Wüsterian tradition, but also from the history of Western philosophy. Stove 
provides the definitive refutation (Franklin, 2002). Here we need note only 
that such arguments run counter not just to the successes, but to the very 
existence, of science and technology as collaborative endeavors. 
The second argument in favor of the concept orientation is what we 
might call the argument from creativity. Designer drugs, for example, are 
conceived, modeled, and described long before they are successfully 
synthesized, and the plans of pharmaceutical companies may contain 
putative references to the corresponding chemical universals long before 
there are instances in reality. But again, such descriptions and plans can be 
expressed perfectly within terminologies and ontologies conceived as 
representing only what is real. For descriptions and plans do, after all, 
exist. On the other hand, it would be an error to include in a scientific 
ontology of drugs terms referring to pharmaceutical products which do not 
yet (and may never) exist, solely on the basis of plans and descriptions. 
Rather, such terms should be included only at the point where the 
corresponding instances do, indeed, exist in reality. 
Third is what we might call the argument from unicorns. According to 
this argument, some of the terms needed in medical terminologies refer to 
what does not exist. After all, some patients do believe that they have three 
arms, or that they are being pursued by aliens. But the realist conception is 
also equipped to handle phenomena such as these. False beliefs and 
hallucinations are, of course, every bit as real as the patients who 
experience them. And certainly such beliefs and episodes may involve 
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concepts (in the proper, psychological sense of this term). But they are not 
about concepts, and they do not have concepts as their objects; for their 
subjects take them to be about entities in external reality instead. Believing 
in the concept of aliens in pursuit is not nearly as frightening as believing 
that there are actual aliens. These patients are making an error, whose 
proper explanation in our patient records does not consist in asserting that 
the patients in question, in fact, believed in merely the concept of aliens all 
along. Such an explanation cannot account for the anxious behavior 
associated with believing in aliens. 
Fourth is the argument from medical history. The history of medicine is 
a scientific pursuit; yet it has often used terms such as ‘phlogiston’ which 
do not refer to universals in reality. But the domain of the history of 
medicine is precisely constituted of the beliefs, both true and false, of 
former generations. Thus, it is expected that a term like ‘phlogiston’ should 
be included in the ontology of this discipline; not, however, as a free-
standing term with a concept as its referent. Rather ‘phlogiston’ should 
occur as a constituent part of terms denoting the corresponding kinds of 
beliefs (Smith, 2005b). 
Fifth is the argument from syndromes. The biological and medical 
domains contain multitudes of entities which do not exist in reality, but 
which serve nonetheless as convenient abstractions. For example, a 
syndrome such as congestive heart failure is an abstraction used for the 
convenience of physicians for the purpose of collecting under one umbrella 
term certain disparate and unrelated diseases which have common 
manifestations or symptoms. Such abstractions are, it is held, mere 
concepts. From a realist perspective, however, syndromes, pathways, 
genetic networks, and similar phenomena are fully real, though their reality 
is that of defined (fiat) classes, rather than of universals. That is, they are 
real in the sense that they belong to real classes which have been defined 
by human beings for the very purpose of talking about things which we do 
not yet fully understand. We may say something similar about the many 
human-dependent expressions like ‘obesity’, ‘hypertension’, or ‘abnormal 
curvature of spine’. These terms, too, refer to entities in reality, namely to 
defined classes which rest on what may be changing fiat thresholds 
established by consensus among physicians. 
Sixth is the argument from error. Logical conflicts can arise when 
falsehoods are entered into a clinical record and interpreted as being about 
real entities. Rector, et al.take this to imply that the use of a meta-language 
should be made compulsory for all statements in the electronic health 
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record (EHR). The terms in terminologies devised to link up with such 
EHRs would refer, not to diseases themselves, but rather merely to the 
concepts of diseases on the part of clinicians. Thus what is recorded should 
not be seen as pertaining to real entities at all, but rather to what are called 
findings (Rector, 1991). Instead of recording both p and not p, the record 
would contain entries like: McX observed p while O’W observed not p.
Since these entries are about observations, logical contradictions are 
avoided.
We do not, of course, dispute the fact that clinicians have a perfectly 
legitimate need to record findings such as an absent finger or an absent 
nipple. What is disputed, however, is Rector’s inference from the fact that 
there might be falsehoods among the totality of assertions about a given 
clinical case (or scientific domain), to the conclusion that clinicians (or 
scientists) should cease to make assertions about the world and, rather, 
confine themselves to assertions about beliefs. 
This proposal contributes to a blurring of the distinction between 
entities in reality and associated findings. Information about beliefs is 
fundamentally different in nature from information about objects. Failing 
to make this explicit allows terminologies to include findings-related 
expressions in the same category as expressions which designate entities in 
reality as, for example, in the following assertions from SNOMED CT: 
‘Genus Mycoplasma (organism) is_a Prokaryote-cell wall absent 
(organism) is_a bacteria (organism)’ and ‘Human leukocyte antigen (HLA) 
antigen absent (substance) is_a Human leukocyte antigen (HLA) antigen 
(substance)’. This running together of two fundamentally different types of 
assertions introduces obstacles to the working of automatic reasoning 
systems that employ them as basis. 
Of course, we do not deny that clinicians face the need to record, not 
only the entities on the side of the patient, but also their own beliefs and 
observations about these entities. Indeed, Rector’s argument for the move 
to conceiving the record as being a record of facts about beliefs rather than 
of facts about the world is importantly buttressed by appeal to legal 
considerations which require that the EHR provide an audit trail relating, 
precisely, to beliefs and actions on the side of medical practitioners. The 
EHR must serve forensic purposes. From the realist point of view, 
however, these forensic purposes can be served equally well by a record of 
facts about the world, as long as we ensure that (a) such facts include facts 
about beliefs and actions of practitioners (conceived as full-fledged 
denizens of reality), and (b) the record also preserves data about who 
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recorded those facts, at what time they were recorded, and so forth, as 
according to the strategy we outlined in Ceusters and Smith (2006). 
On behalf the realist orientation, it can be argued further that even the 
move to assertions about beliefs would not, in fact, solve the mentioned 
problems of error, logical contradiction, and legal liability. For the very 
same problems of inadequacy can arise, not only when human beings are 
describing fractures, pulse rates, coughing, or swellings, but also when 
they are describing what clinicians have heard, seen, thought, and done. In 
this respect, these two sets of descriptions are in the same boat, as each is a 
case of humans describing something. Hence, both are subject to error, 
fraud, and disagreement in interpretation. The alternative to the Rector 
approach, we believe, is to provide facilities with the ability to quarantine 
erroneous entries – and to resolve the concomitant logical conflicts – as 
they are identified; for example, by appealing to the resources provided by 
formal theories of belief revision as outlined in Gärdenfors (2003).
The seventh, and final, argument for the concept orientation as a basis 
for biomedical terminology development is the argument from borderline 
cases. There is often, it is said, no clear border between those general terms 
which designate universals in reality and those which merely designate 
classes defined by human beings to serve some purpose. Certainly there are 
clear cases on either side; for example, ‘electron’ or ‘cell’, on the one hand, 
and ‘fall on stairs or ladders in water transport NOS, occupant of small 
unpowered boat injured’ (Read Codes), on the other. But there are also 
borderline cases such as ‘alcoholic non-smoker with diabetes’, or ‘age 
dependent yeast cell size increase’, which might seem to call into question 
the very basis of the distinction. 
We will respond, first, with the general point that arguments from the 
existence of borderline cases usually have very little force. Borderline 
cases do not undermine the distinction between the entities on either side. 
The grey area of twilight does not prevent us from distinguishing day from 
night. Likewise, we can distinguish the bald from the hairy even though we 
do not know exactly how many hairs one must lose to traverse the border. 
As to the specific problem of how to deal with borderline expressions of 
the sorts mentioned – expressions which seem to lie midway between 
designating universals and designating mere arbitrary classes – this is, in 
our view, a problem for empirical science, not for terminology. That is, we 
believe that the normal processes of scientific advance will bring it about 
that such borderline terms will undergo a filtering process. This process is 
based on whether they are needed for purposes of fruitful classifications 
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(for example, for the expression of scientific laws), or for purposes of 
arbitrary classification (for example, when describing eligible populations 
for trials). 
One generation of scientists may take a given term to refer to a 
universal, whereas the next generation may discover a reason to believe 
that the term does not designate anything at all (for example, ‘caloric’), or 
recognize that it, in fact, refers ambiguously to several universals which 
must be carefully distinguished (‘hepatitis’). Thus, representational 
artifacts such as information systems and textbooks, which form an 
integral part of the practice of science, must be continually updated in light 
of such advances. But again, we can think of no circumstance in which 
updating of the sort in question would signify that caloric is a concept, or 
that some expression, at one or other stage, was being used by scientists 
with the intention of referring to concepts rather than to entities in reality. 
I.3.2. Concepts are Ethereal 
The problematic features of common uses of the term ‘concept’ are not 
peculiar to the world of biomedical terminology; indeed, they arise 
generally in the knowledge-representation literature on semantic networks 
(for example, see Sowa, 1992) and conceptual models (Smith, 2006). Here 
again, concepts (variously called ‘classes’, ‘entity types’, ‘object types’, 
though information scientists will disagree as to whether the same thing is 
being expressed by all of these terms) are called upon to perform, at least, 
two conflicting roles. On the one hand, inside the computer they are 
delegated to represent concrete entities and the classes of such entities that 
exist in reality outside of the computer. For example, some abstract proxy – 
some ghostly diabetes counterpart – is required for this purpose, it is held, 
because one cannot get diabetes itself inside the computer. And the 
computer could reason about diabetes only by creating such a proxy (so the 
programmer supposes). On the other hand, concepts are delegated to 
playing the role of representing, in the computer, the knowledge in the 
minds of human experts. This knowledge is, then, itself characteristically 
(and again erroneously, as Putnam (1975) argues) assumed to be 
identifiable with the meanings of the terms such experts use and, in this 
way, the painful polysemy of ‘concept’ is inherited by the word 
‘knowledge’ and its cognates. 
Because concepts are pressed into service to perform these various roles, 
they acquire certain ethereal qualities. Concepts, then, are triply ethereal, 
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existing in a different sort of denatured guise in the machine, the human 
mind, and among the meanings stored in language. Their ethereal nature 
implies that concepts are not the sort of thing that can be examined or 
inspected. We know what it means to raise and answer questions about, 
say, a case of diabetes, or about the disease diabetes itself. We can turn 
towards both of these things by directing our attentions to corresponding 
entities in the world; we can make what it is on the side of the patient the 
target of our mental acts (that to which these acts are directed). We can 
concern ourselves with traits of the disease or properties of the patient, and 
we can weigh the separate views advanced by different observers in light 
of the degree to which they do justice to these traits. But it seems that we 
can do none of these things in relation to entities in the realm of concepts. 
The pertinent literature in philosophy and psychology (Margolis, 1999) 
suggests that concepts are most properly understood, not as targets of our 
cognitive acts, but rather as their contents, as that which determines what 
the target should be and how, in a given act, it should be represented. If this 
is so, then our puzzlement in the face of questions as to the nature of 
concepts is understandable. The concept orientation rests precisely on the 
tacit assumption that concepts would serve as targets – indeed, as the 
primary targets of concern in work on terminologies – when, in fact, they 
serve as contents.
I.3.3. The Realm of Concepts Does Not Exist 
A further illustration of the problems associated with the concept 
orientation is provided by Campbell (1998), in which Keith Campbell, 
Diane Oliver, Kent Spackman, and Edward Shortliffe – four distinguished 
figures in contemporary medical informatics – discuss the relevance of the 
Unified Medical Language System (UMLS, see National Library of 
Medicine) to current terminology work. 
The UMLS Metathesaurus is a well known resource which gathers terms 
from different source terminologies into a single compendium, with the 
goal of creating what it calls unified meaning across terminologies. By this 
its authors mean, roughly, that it creates a framework of common meanings 
which can be used to provide access to the plurality of meanings carried by 
terms in the Metathesaurus which derive from a plurality of source 
terminologies and, consequently, are associated with a plurality of 
definitions. The purpose is to ensure that everybody who encounters a 
medical term in a document can use the UMLS to find out the term’s 
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possible meanings. Here, ‘unifying’ is understood as bringing under one 
framework.
The problem is that the Metathesaurus attempts to do this by creating 
unified meanings even for those terms which, as they occur in the 
respective separate source terminologies, clearly have different extensions 
in the actual world. For example, it assigns the same concept unique 
identifier (CUI) to both ‘aspirin’ and ‘Aspergum’. In other words, it treats 
these two terms as if they would refer to (or express) one and the same 
concept.
Campbell’s (1998) thesis is that this is allowed because there is a 
Possible World (the authors cite in this connection the work of Leibniz) in 
which ‘aspirin’ and ‘Aspergum’ do in fact refer to one and the same thing 
(p. 426). That is, the authors seem to be pointing out that there are 
situations in which aspirin and Aspergum can be ingested interchangeably. 
Of course, as the authors admit: 
Many clinicians would not regard different formulations of aspirin... as 
interchangeable concepts in the prescriptions they write. Although aspirin may be 
an abstract concept, Ecotrin and Aspergum have specific formulations 
(extensions) in our corporeal world, and use of those particular formulations is 
subject to different indications, mechanisms of therapy, and risks to the patient. 
Clearly then, in at least a pharmacy order-entry system, any extensional 
relationship that was used to determine allowable substitution of pharmacologic 
formulations would need to have different relationships (representing a different 
Possible World), than the one currently embodied within the UMLS. However, 
for a system primarily concerned with the active ingredients of a drug, such as an 
allergy or drug interaction application, the Possible World embodied in the UMLS 
may be optimal. (Campbell, 1998, p. 429) 
At this point, two questions arise. First, in what sense does the UMLS 
actually unify the meanings of terms? If it only unifies them for certain 
specific purposes – say, for example, the purposes of those concerned only 
with a drug’s active ingredients – then it seems to be restricting terms’ 
meanings, rather than unifying them. 
Second, in what sense is the world, thus defined, possible, given that it 
would have to be governed by laws of nature different from those in 
operation here on earth? The answer is that it is possible, at best, as an 
artifact, something artificial, inhabiting the same high-plasticity conceptual 
realm that is postulated by Wüster and his colleagues, a realm in which 
aspirin may be an abstract concept. In Campbell (1998), the UMLS is itself 
correspondingly referred to as an artificial world, as contrasted with our 
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corporeal world of flesh and blood entities. And the job of this artificial 
world is asserted to be that of providing ‘a link between the realm in which 
we live and the symbolic world in which computer programs operate’ (p. 
426).
Three worlds have hereby been distinguished: 
 (1) the possible (‘artificial’) world which is the UMLS, 
  (2) the ‘symbolic world’ in which computer programs operate, 
  (3) the ‘corporeal world’ in which we live. 
How can world (1) link worlds (2) and (3) together? The answer, surely, 
must involve some appeal to the extensions of the concepts in the UMLS. 
Extensions are understood as collections of the individual objects (actual 
patients, actual pains in actual heads, actual pieces of Aspergum chewed) 
in the corporeal world. The authors themselves suggest a reading along 
these lines when they point out (p. 424), in regard to the terms existing in 
the UMLS source terminologies, that: 
[o]n the one hand there are the physical objects to which [an expression like 
‘aspirin’] refers (the expression’s extensional component) and on the other there 
are the characteristic features of the physical object used to identify it (the 
expression’s intensional component). 
When it comes to the UMLS itself, however, they abandon this 
traditional philosophical view in favor of a view according to which (if we 
have understood their formulations correctly) the extensions of the 
concepts in the UMLS would be sets of concepts drawn from source 
terminologies:
the developers [of the UMLS] collected the language that others had codified into 
terminological systems, provided a framework where the intension (connotation) 
of terms of those systems could be preserved, and unified those systems [into one 
unified system] by providing a representation of extensional meaning by 
collecting abstract concepts into sets that can be interpreted to represent their 
extension (p. 425). 
They then assert that: 
[t]hese extensional sets are codified by the Concept Unique Identifier (CUI) in the 
UMLS. We argue that the ‘meaning’ of this identifier is only understandable 
extensionally, by examining the characteristics shared by all abstract concepts 
linked by a CUI (p. 426). 
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By interpreting ‘extension’ in Wüsterian fashion (which means 
conceiving extensions in abstraction from the corresponding instances in 
reality), our authors deny the possibility that the UMLS provides the 
desired link between the symbolic dimension of computer programs and 
the domain of real-world entities. 
In hindsight, we can see that, with their talk of the UMLS as building a 
bridge between computers and corporeal reality, Campbell, Oliver, 
Spackman, and Shortliffe have projected onto the UMLS a goal more 
ambitious than that which it was really intended to serve. Its actual goal 
was that of finding unified meaning across terminologies. This weaker goal 
has proved unrealizable, for the same reason that the concept orientation in 
general is unrealizable (though there may be some practical value in the 
imperfect realization even of the weaker goal of unified meaning; for 
example, in expanding the number of synonyms that can be used to find a 
target term in a specific terminology). We are still free, however, to 
readdress the more ambitious goal of building a bridge between computers 
and corporeal reality, a goal which, with the ineluctable expansion in the 
use of computers in clinical care (and especially in evidenced-based 
medicine), becomes ever more urgent.  
Part II: Bridging Computers and the World
We have claimed that the concept orientation places severe limitations on 
terminologies to fulfill their potential to support computer applications, a 
task for which we have claimed that the realist orientation is better suited. 
In what follows, the reasons for this should become clear. 
II.1. How Terms are Introduced into the Language of Medicine 
Consider what happens when a new disorder first begins to make itself 
manifest. Slowly, through the official and unofficial cooperation of 
physicians, patients, public health authorities, and other involved parties, a 
view becomes established that a certain family of cases, manifesting a 
newly apparent constellation of symptoms, represents instances of a 
hitherto unrecognized kind. This kind is a part of reality and, as we have 
seen above, it corresponds to what realist philosophers call a universal. 
The problem is that, in many cases, it is difficult to grasp what universal 
given particulars are instances of. When a disease universal first begins to 
make itself manifest in a family of clinical cases, it will be barely 
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understood. Something similar applies when a new kind of virus or gene, 
or a new kind of biochemical reaction in the cell, is first detected. 
In such cases, a new term is needed to refer to the newly apparent kind. 
Eventually those involved come to an agreement to use, from here on, (1) 
this term for (2) these instances of (3) this kind. The concept orientation, 
however, postulates (4) a new concept, together with (5) a definition.
II.2. Definitions 
On the original ISO-Wüster paradigm, a concept is given what Wüster 
calls an intensional definition, which is an attempt to describe a type of 
object by referring to characteristic features that its instances have in 
common. This account works well enough in the relatively straightforward 
area of woodworking equipment, where Wüster came up with his ideas on 
concepts and definitions. It works well, too, in a domain like chemistry, for 
many molecular structures can indeed be precisely and unproblematically 
defined in terms of exactly repeatable patterns. 
However, it confronts two problems in the domain of medicine. One 
problem occurs in cases where a new universal has only begun to make 
itself manifest, such as SARS, and it is not yet certain how it is 
instantiated. Another is that, even if a universal is fairly well understood, 
we may encounter many instances of it which do not have very many 
characteristics in common. For example, consider a particular butterfly 
which might be known to several people, but only at distinct phases of its 
development. A similar problem is faced when drawing together 
knowledge concerning successive phases in the development of what is not 
yet recognized as one single disease. 
While in regard to an individual case, users of the term may know 
precisely what they are referring to (they can point to it in the lab or 
clinic); nevertheless, it may be difficult to convey this information to 
others. In such cases, the user has a clear understanding of what the term 
designates in reality, but only at the level of instances and not yet at the 
level of universals. As in the case of SARS, or Legionnaires Disease, a 
term may be introduced as a provisional aid to communication even though 
the phenomenon has not yet been identified or clearly understood on the 
level of universals and, on the concept orientation, this means that a new 
concept is thereby introduced in tandem with this term. 
There are three strategies which terminologies often employ with respect 
to providing definitions for new, or problematic, concepts. One is to leave 
102
them undefined, as in the terminology found in SNOMED CT 
(Bodenreider, 2004). This strategy is itself problematic, for the fewer 
defined terms a terminology contains, of course, the less value it provides 
to its users. 
The second strategy is for terminologies to fabricate definitions 
effectively by permuting the constituent words of the term in question. 
This occurs, for example, in the National Cancer Institute Thesaurus’s 
definition of ‘cancer death rates’ as ‘mortality due to cancer’. This 
practice does not define a term; rather, it merely offers a rewritten version 
of the term itself. This is akin to defining ‘SARS’ as meaning severe acute 
respiratory syndrome. This is unhelpful, because not every case of severe 
acute respiratory syndrome is in fact a case of SARS. The latter covers 
only those cases of the severe acute respiratory syndrome first identified in 
Guangdong, China in February 2002 and caused by instances of a certain 
particular coronavirus whose genome was first sequenced in Canada in 
April 2003. (www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5217a5.htm)  
On the realist orientation, it is recognized that, when more is learned 
about the new kind that has been discovered, the meaning of the term used 
to designate that kind will change accordingly. The realist’s goal is for a 
definition to track the development of our scientific knowledge about the 
world and, ultimately, to capture reality as it is in itself. In our present case, 
this means capturing that which all instances of a given disease share in 
common. A real definition provides necessary and sufficient conditions 
under which it is appropriate to use the term in question as, for example, in 
this definition taken from the Foundational Model of Anatomy Ontology: 
x is a cell =def. x is an anatomical structure which has as its boundary the 
external surface of a maximally connected plasma membrane. 
Such a definition describes the real-world conditions under which it is 
appropriate to use the corresponding term. For many medical terms, only 
some small number of necessary conditions has been identified thus far. In 
such cases, it is the job of the definition to describe a partial and still 
amendable view of what a term actually refers to according to current 
usage, to be amended as knowledge about it increases. 
II.3. Putting Realism to Work
Realism sees each terminology as a work in progress reflecting the secure, 
yet fallible beliefs held at the pertinent stage in the development of 
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biomedicine about how particular entities in reality are to be classified as 
instances of universals. Ideally, the result of these works in progress is the 
increase in the total sum of true beliefs about universals as well as about 
particulars so that, for example, in biomedicine there is a broad 
accumulation of knowledge. It is this ideal which the Open Biomedical 
Ontologies (OBO) Foundry is currently attempting to realize in practice. 
Mixed in with such knowledge, however, there will be a small and ever-
changing admixture of false beliefs and confusions at every stage. Here, 
the part of this admixture which concerns us takes the form of terms in a 
terminology that are believed to refer to some corresponding universal, but 
which actually do not do so. This can be either because there is no 
universal at all which can serve as referent of the term in question, or 
because the term refers ambiguously to what is, in fact, a plurality of 
universals. With this in mind, we have developed realist counterparts of the 
three central Cimino desiderata:  
Each preferred term in a terminology must correspond to at least one universal 
(non-vagueness).
Each term must correspond to no more than one universal (non-ambiguity). 
Each universal must itself correspond to no more than one term (non-
redundancy). 
These desiderata are not realizable by any terminological adjustments 
that are motivated merely by considerations of meaning and language. 
Rather, they need to be accepted as long-term goals, to which 
terminologists will come ever closer but never completely realize. In 
moving towards their realization, terminologists must always follow on the 
coat-tails of those engaged in empirical research in the attempt to expand 
our body of knowledge of biomedical universals and their instantiations. 
II.3.1. Knowledge of Universals vs. Knowledge of Instances 
The realist proposal, here, amounts to turning the concept approach onto its 
head. Whereas the concept approach starts from the top down, letting our 
thoughts frame our beliefs about reality, the realist approach starts from the 
bottom up, with the goal of allowing reality itself to form our beliefs about 
its denizens in a direct way. 
Whereas the concept approach admits of only one type of knowledge 
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(knowledge, precisely, of concepts), the realist approach allows us to 
distinguish two types: knowledge of universals and knowledge of 
instances. Knowledge of universals is the sort of general knowledge that is 
recorded, for example, in the textbooks of biomedical science; it is 
knowledge about the types of entities (such as tuberculosis) that there are 
in the world. Knowledge of instances is the particular knowledge of 
specific, concrete things (such as this or that particular case of 
tuberculosis). 
We have already seen that it is general knowledge that terminologies are 
intended to capture, if they are to achieve their practical effect. The domain 
covered by each terminology comprehends a wide variety of different 
kinds or categories of universals. In the realm of disorders, these include 
symptoms, pathological, and non-pathological anatomical structures, acts 
of human beings (for example anesthetizings, observings), biological 
processes (disease pathways, processes of development and growth), and 
more.
In contrast to what is the case in many areas of science, in the domain of 
clinical medicine knowledge of instances of such universals is of 
considerable value as well. It is such knowledge that is recorded in clinical 
records; for example, of patient visits, of emergency call centers, of 
laboratory results, and so forth. This sort of knowledge is also recorded in 
automated EHR systems, whose goal is to facilitate clinical data entry in 
such a way as to enable it to be both used by a human being, and 
interpreted by a computer application. 
The knowledge represented in EHRs is intimately related to the 
knowledge represented in terminologies. It is through increased discoveries 
about the sorts of particulars described by EHRs that we gain knowledge 
about the universals catalogued in clinical terminologies. Obtaining 
knowledge of a universal, in turn, puts us in a position to recognize 
particular instances when we come across them. In fact, both kinds of 
knowledge are indispensable, not only to clinical diagnosis, but to all 
forms of scientific research. 
The better our systems are for keeping track of particulars in the clinical 
domain, the more efficiently our knowledge of the universals in this 
domain will be able to advance. However, current EHR regimes embody 
certain impediments to this advance which, we believe, can be overcome 
with the help of the realist approach. 
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II.2.2. Realism and EHR Systems 
Most existing EHR systems allow direct reference only to two sorts of 
particulars in reality, namely, (i) human beings (patients, care-providers, 
family members), via proper names or via alphanumeric patient IDs, and 
(ii) times at which actions are performed or observations are made 
(Ceusters, 2005). 
This impoverished repertoire of types of direct reference to particulars 
means that no adequate means is available to keep track of instantiations of 
other types of universals (for example, a specific wound, or fracture, or 
tumor) over an extended period of time. When interpreting health record 
data, it is correspondingly difficult to distinguish clearly between multiple 
examples of the same particular, such as this tumor, and multiple 
particulars of the same general kind, such as any tumor existing in patient 
Brown (Ceusters, 2006). 
When a clinician needs to record information about some particular 
within different contexts – for example, as it exists at different points in 
time – he must create an entirely new record for each such reference. This 
is done via some combination of general terms (or associated codes) with 
designators for particular patients and times; for example, in expressions 
like, the fever of patient #1001 observed by physician #4001 at time #9001.
Unfortunately, such composites, even where they are formulated by the 
same physician using the same general terms deriving from the same 
coding system, constitute barriers to reasoning about the corresponding 
entities in software systems, above all because it cannot be 
unproblematically inferred when such an expression refers to the same 
entity as does some other, similarly constituted expression. (Imagine a 
regime for reasoning about human beings as they change and develop over 
time in which people could be referred to only by means of expressions 
like, ‘patient in third bed from left’, or ‘person discharged after 
appendectomy’, or ‘relative of probable smoker’) These sorts of limitations 
to the knowledge-gathering potential of current EHRs place obstacles in 
the way of our drawing inferences – for example, for scientific research or 
public health purposes – from our knowledge of different instances of the 
same clinical universal in different patients (Ceusters, 2006). 
Hence, a way to make the corresponding instances directly visible to 
reasoning systems is needed (which means visible without need for prior 
processing). We need to create a regime in which every real-world entity 
that becomes relevant to the treatment of a patient is explicitly recorded in 
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the course of data entry. The first step is to expand the repertoire of 
universals recognized by EHR systems in such a way as to include, in 
addition to patient and time, a wide array of other diagnostically salient 
categories such as disorder, symptom, pharmaceutical substance, event (for
example an accident in which the patient was involved), image,
observation, drug interaction, and so on. When this is done, each entity 
that is relevant to the diagnostic process in a given case should be assigned 
an explicit alphanumerical ID – what we have elsewhere called an instance 
unique identifier (IUI) (Ceusters, 2006) – that is analogous to a proper 
name.
This would allow EHR systems to do justice to what it is on the side of 
the patient, in all its richness and complexity. It would also provide an easy 
means of doing justice to the different views of one and the same instance 
of a given disorder that may become incorporated into the record; for 
example, when physician A writes ‘tumor’ and physician B writes 
‘CAAA12’. The use of IUIs allows us to map the corresponding particulars 
in our computer representations with one another in a way which serves to 
make it clear when different physicians are referring to one and the same 
particular. Indeed, the cumulative result of such use can be understood as a 
map of the domain in question, showing the multifarious ways in which the 
universals in the domain relate to one another. In the next chapter, we will 
see how such maps can be put to use for the purpose of increasing our 
scientific knowledge of universals and instances alike. 
Conclusion
The original motivation for the concept orientation was that it provides a 
means of representing information which is immune to the vagaries of 
thought as expressed in natural language. We have shown that the concept 
orientation, even when Cimino’s desiderata are realized, is beset with flaws 
which hamper our ability to use terminologies and electronic health records 
to their full potential. We have advocated a realist orientation, which 
enables us to bypass the postulation of a conceptual realm and, instead, to 
engage in the creation of ever-more detailed maps of that reality which, in 
science and in clinical care, should always be our primary focus.
107

